![]() ![]() Typically, access is provided across an institutional network to a range of IP addresses. If you are a member of an institution with an active account, you may be able to access content in one of the following ways: Get help with access Institutional accessĪccess to content on Oxford Academic is often provided through institutional subscriptions and purchases. While it might be conceded that the infinitist has a plausible account of what it is for a belief to be defensible, it is not a plausible account of what it is for a belief to be justified. This chapter argues that the infinitist cannot avoid the foundationalist’s regress arguments. ![]() The foundationalist’s fear that this puts too much strain on finite beings is, Klein, argues, misguided. Against the coherentist, we should insist that to have justification for believing any proposition we must have the capacity to put forward non-circular reasons in support of the proposition, non-circular reasons in support of whatever reasons we appeal to, non-circular reasons in support of those reasons and so on, ad infinitum. Klein’s infinitist rejects the choices offered by these two views as a false dilemma. The coherentist is convinced that there is no escaping the “circle of belief” and the best we can do is maximize relations of coherence among our beliefs. The foundationalist is convinced that all justification terminates in a foundation of noninferential justification. And it is to Peter Klein’s great credit that he has added to the traditional debates a new and interesting proposal for how to understand the structure of justification. Questions concerning the structure of justification lie at the heart of epistemology. ![]()
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